I. INTRODUCTION
During World War II, the U.S. Government sought out contractors in the name of "patriotism" to research and develop nuclear materials for this country's defense. Nearly seventy years later, we are still dealing with the effects of that research. However, the issue of who should bear responsibility for the long-term effects is still being argued. One of the major issues is whether those contractors are allowed to raise the federal contractor defense.
The common law federal contractor defense arises out of basic principles of governmental immunity. The defense protects government contractors from liability for any harm arising out the performance of a government contract, specifically in the areas of military and defense work, if the contractor was following the government's directions and the work performed was in an area of "uniquely federal" concern.
The issue of application of federal contractor liability defense has most recently been addressed in the Hanford litigation. The Hanford litigation 1 stems from the long-term effects of the production of plutonium in Hanford, Washington by various contractors during World War Two. E.I. DuPont, a corporate defendant in the Hanford litigation, attempted to utilize the government contractor defense to seek dismissal from the suit. The Ninth Circuit held that the Price-Anderson Act preempts the federal government contractor defense and therefore E.I. DuPont could not be dismissed from the Hanford litigation.
Following a brief overview of the Price-Anderson Act and the Hanford litigation, this note will detail the weaknesses in the Ninth's Circuit's reasoning regarding the application of the federal contractor defense. The federal contractor defense should be applied in the Hanford case because it existed prior to the Price-Anderson Act's 1988 amendments and does not contradict the purpose of the Price-Anderson Act. Additionally, there are serious issues with the nuclear industry that should be considered before denying application of this defense to contractors like E.I. DuPont.
II. THE BIGGER PICTURE: WHY APPLICATION OF THIS DEFENSE IN THIS CASE IS IMPORTANT
Nuclear energy is a hot topic in the United States today. With a new emphasis on environmentalism, the issue will only become more prominent. However, there are many obstacles in the way of pushing forward with this environmentally friendly, carbon-free form of energy. Nuclear waste, funding, heavy regulation, and public perception are all major players in the future of nuclear energy.
The nuclear industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the country. The U.S. Department of Energy has ultimate responsibility for regulating the nuclear industry through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Each year, the NRC awards about $80,000,000 in contracts to private 2 entities. However, the number of companies involved in the nuclear industry 3 is rather small. There are only 25 different operators of nuclear power plants in the U.S. today. 4 Even the courts that decided Hanford do not contest that the nuclear industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the country. The Ninth Circuit clearly stated that "[i]t is not disputed that the federal government is in charge of nuclear safety." The court also states that "'the 5 safety of nuclear technology [is] exclusively the business of the Federal Government,' which has 'occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns.'" These assertions are not unfounded. There is a long history of 6 regulation of the nuclear industry. The federal government made the first developments in nuclear power and technologies. Energy plans to take title to the commercial nuclear waste and manage its disposal. To date, the federal government has failed to fulfill its obligations 17 under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and has been sued regarding its breach of contract and has lost, with the courts rejecting its excuses and holding the government liable for all damages caused by the excessive delays in the completion of Yucca Mountain.
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The history detailed above portrays an industry that faces government interference, regulation, and oversight in nearly every aspect. With so much at stake, there will be tension between commercial entities, industry contractors, and federal government. When both private companies and the federal government work together under the heavy regulation of the federal government and for the sole purposes of federal government use, it must be clear who will bear the responsibility for the risks. Any potential contractor who signs on to work with the federal government for non-energy, strictly governmental nuclear purposes needs to know before agreeing to work whether they will be responsible for damages should any liability arise. Additionally, the public needs a clearer distinction between the federal government nuclear industry and the private commercial nuclear energy industry. So many fears regarding nuclear energy actually stem from nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are not the same 19 thing. Nuclear weapons and nuclear energy require different formulas or fuel, as well as different production. This is not to say that the public should be 20 denied some form of protection in case there is a nuclear accident, but the roles and responsibility of the private commercial sector and the federal government need to be clearly distinguished for everyone involved, especially the public.
III. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
In 1957, Congress enacted the "Price-Anderson Act" (PAA) as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, to ensure the availability of "a large pool of funds to provide for prompt and orderly compensation of members of the public who incur damages from a nuclear or radiological incident no matter who might be liable." The PAA requires indemnification contracts for 21 personal injury and property damage. This Act covers any party that may be 22 legally liable. Therefore a claimant can directly sue a licensee or contractor after a nuclear accident. The PAA covers operation of power reactors, 23 research reactors, the Department of Energy's nuclear and radiological facilities, and the transportation of nuclear fuel from any one of these facilities.
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The PAA creates a scheme of insurance pooling, which pools contributions from all licensed nuclear facilities and requires facilities to secure private insurance to ensure that sufficient funds are readily available to pay for any nuclear accident. This method spreads the risk over a "large 25 financial base." The PAA also includes indemnifications by the DOE.
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This DOE indemnification: (1) provides omnibus coverage of all persons who might be legally liable; (2) indemnifies fully all legal liability up to the statutory limit on such liability (currently $9.43 billion for a nuclear incident in the United States); (3) covers all DOE contractual activity that might result in a nuclear incident in the United States; (4) is not subject to the usual limitation on the availability of appropriated funds; and (5) would not allow a decrease in plutonium production. GE continued to operate the facility in accordance with the set government standards.
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In the late 1980s, the DOE created the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project ("HEDR") to estimate the possible exposure of radiation to those living around the Hanford facility. The project found that 
B. Arguments
One of the most contested issues in the Hanford case was whether E.I. DuPont should be exempt from liability under the Price-Anderson Act according to the federal common law government contractor exception. The E.I. DuPont argued that the federal contractor defense should apply to them in this case and they should be dismissed as a defendant. The Court explained in Boyle v. United Technologies that this defense grants the government contractor the same immunity as if it were the government itself, so long as the contractor complied strictly with the terms of the government contract and regulations. E.I. DuPont argued that they could not be held 49 strictly liable because they were following the federal government's orders and the emissions were within approved levels.
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C. Court Decisions
Initially, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Washington struck down the defense, holding that the Price-Anderson Act "displaced any such defense as a matter of law" because the defense could not be reconciled with the PAA. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the defendants raised the issue 51 again whether they, as government contractors, could be exempted from liability using the federal contractor defense. The circuit court took a slightly 52 different approach than the district court and held that the federal contractor defense could not be applied because the defense was not "well-established" at the time that the Price-Anderson Act was enacted and therefore, was not included as part of the liability scheme of the act. While, the circuit court 53 agreed with E.I. DuPont that the contractor defense might extend to them as they did operate a military production facility pursuant to government specifications and under government orders, the court noted that it must also consider the Price-Anderson Act before applying the defense because it is unclear whether this Congressional Act preempts the federal common law doctrine of federal contractor immunity.
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In reaching its decision, the circuit court used language of the Supreme States v. Texas held that if a federal statute is enacted after a common law doctrine has been established, the federal common law will only be preempted if the statute directly addresses the common law principle. The rationale for 57 this rule is that if the common law doctrine is "well-established," it must be assumed that Congress accounted for this doctrine in enacting the statute.
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The circuit court focused on the "well-established" element of the test and determined that the federal common law defense was not well-established when the Price-Anderson Act was enacted or when the Act was amended in 1988. maintained that the scope of the defense was not well defined until Boyle and therefore held that it was not incorporated into the Price-Anderson Act.
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Additionally, E.I. DuPont faced another problem in applying this defense because the emissions at issue took place during 1944 to 1946, before GE took over and before the Atomic Energy Commission was created to regulate the production of plutonium. Without strict regulations, the defense is more 69 difficult to apply. Admittedly, E.I. DuPont was essentially a researcher for the government and had a lot of discretion in their research and production of plutonium because this research had never been done before, and the concept was new. The government hired E.I. DuPont to pave the way in the field of 70 plutonium production and nuclear weapons. from the manufacturer and the manufacturer must have warned the government of any dangers known to the manufacturer.
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Obviously, military equipment is very important to the defense of the United States. However, the interest in getting the nuclear work done in Hanford was possibly even stronger. E.I. DuPont was recruited and eventually accepted a contract to research and produce plutonium to advance the ongoing war effort during World War Two with the idea that such research was 79 necessary to defend the country against a possibly imminent attack. Both of 80 these cases have a very strong federal interest: national defense. National defense is the responsibility of the federal government, and work on that 81 federal interest may lead to use of the contractor defense.
In both Boyle and Hanford, the state-imposed duty of care was contradictory to the obligations under the government contracts. In Boyle, the duty imposed by the state to equip helicopters in certain ways for safety was directly contradictory to the standards set by the government contract in which the helicopters were to be made. Likewise, in Hanford, the state-imposed 82 duty to not engage in abnormally dangerous activities clearly conflicts with the duty imposed by the government contract to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, which are inherently dangerous themselves. Finally, there is an 83 interest in allowing discretion on the part of the government in such areas as military equipment and national defense. It makes little sense in either of 84 these cases to hold the contractor liable when the government would be immune from suit in both of these scenarios if it had simply not contracted out the job.
The interests in Hanford and Boyle are very similar in nature, circumstance and the need for application of the federal contractor defense. Therefore, Hanford should be decided the same way.
